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ABSTRACT
Despite the acknowledged need for systems to be both us-
able and secure, we lack guidance on how developers might
build such systems. Based on recent research, we believe
evidence exists that blending techniques from Security, Us-
ability, and Software Engineering can lead to effective de-
sign processes for building such systems. In this position
paper, we discuss two requirements that need to be satisfied
before blending can occur: treat Security and Usability as
complementary, and provide convincing tools for develop-
ers.
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INTRODUCTION
There is no simple answer for why we cannot consistently
build usable and secure systems. A knee-jerk answer would
be to simply blame the developer. However, a developer
might reasonably ask how such a system should be spec-
ified? Even the question of where to start has no agreed
answer. Security and Usability Engineers argue that their re-
spective design techniques need to lead the way; Software
Engineers believe that understanding the characteristics of
the system being built is a more natural first step. Invariably,
the decision of what comes first is delegated to whatever
methodology a developer selects. In applying these, devel-
opers have many techniques to choose from, some of which
include treatment for Security or Usability concerns, yet de-
sign processes do not treat both. Best practice continues to
involve treating Security and Usability as generic qualities
which contend with functionality. Yet, there is growing evi-
dence that the design of usable and secure systems deserves
more attention. The US Department of Homeland Security
as ranked Usable Security as one of the top cyber-security
research topics for government and the private sector [12],
and HCI-Security is a growing research topic. Nevertheless,
there is still a dearth of work prescribing how usable and
secure systems should be built.
Based on the evidence from our research, we believe that
Security, Usability, and Software Engineering lifecycles can
be blended into an effective process for developing software.
However, several requirements need to be satisfied in order
for this to be achieved. We shall discuss two of these in the
following sections.
TREAT SECURITY AND USABILITY AS COMPLEMENTARY
Security and Usability are considered by many developers
to be conflicting qualities. However, if we consider the per-
spectives both communities take on what constitutes design
then we discover that these are complementary. The Se-
curity Engineering community views design as a means of
understanding how a system can be securely developed, or
made more secure; its techniques aim to understand what
system risks are, and what design decisions are necessary
to adequately respond to them. The Usability Engineering
community views design as a means of understanding how a
system can be situated for its users; their techniques are used
to build artifacts embodying users, their goals, and their ac-
tivities.
Both communities treat design not as a process, but as a
hermeneutic circle. Nuseibeh alludes to this in his twin-
peaks model [14], which talks about the dialogue between
requirements and architectural activities. We assert that, when
building usable and secure systems, Usability design insights
can inform Security, and vice-versa. In one Critical Infras-
tructure Protection study we carried out, we found that the
analysis of empirical data contributing to Personas and Sce-
narios led to the discovery of several important vulnerabili-
ties and threats [8]. In another study [to appear], we found
that modelling how one user unintentionally exploited a sys-
tem led to modified security controls, stopping this exploita-
tion, and simultaneously improving the effectiveness and ef-
ficiency of his tasks.
PROVIDE CONVINCING TOOLS
Integrating design techniques from different areas accounts
for little if the resulting data cannot be managed, analysed,
and applied. Unfortunately, the quality of tool-support avail-
able for Security, Usability, and Software Engineering ac-
tivities is variable; tool-support is particularly sparse and
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poorly-integrated during the early stages of design. For ex-
ample, the Requirements Engineering tools of choice con-
tinue to be spreadsheets, word processors, or wikis. In Us-
ability Engineering, software tools are predominantly used
for sketching prototypes rather than supporting conceptual
design. Security design tools often rely on the addition of
modelling extensions to existing CASE tools, e.g. attack tree
support for Eclipse [13], and Misuse Case support for DOORS
[2]. We believe developers will remain ambivalent about the
merits of Security and Usability techniques until convincing
tool-support is available.
Our experiences developing and applying CAIRIS (Com-
puter Aided Integration of Requirements and Information
Security) [1] suggest that tool-support has enormous poten-
tial for fostering the use of Security, Usability, and Soft-
ware Engineering techniques in a single design process. In
our studies, we found that not only can tools encourage the
use of such techniques, but the associations between Secu-
rity, Usability, and Software Engineering concepts can glean
hitherto unnoticed insights from the data they manage. For
example, we have illustrated how simple quantitative and
qualitative data analysis can form the basis for automatically
visualising the impact to Usability of Security design deci-
sions in different contexts of use, and vice versa [5]. Tools
can also lead to process efficiencies in the time taken to build
User-Centered Design artifacts. We recently demonstrated
how the sense-making activities associated with qualitative
data analysis can, with tool-support, be leveraged to semi-
systematically generate Persona characteristics [11].
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